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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Ronald S. Evans*
Deanna D. Cook"
I. 1994 GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION
A. Family Court
The 1993 Virginia General Assembly enacted two bills' to
implement the Judicial Council's report to the Governor and
General Assembly recommending the creation of a Family Court
in Virginia.2 The Family Court was to be in effect January 1,
1995, provided that the 1994 legislative session passed the
necessary funding and appropriation bills. The 1994 Session did
not allocate funds; however, rather than allowing the Family
Court project to lapse by inaction, the legislature delayed imple-
mentation of the court until July 1, 1996.'
B. Child Custody
1. Child Custody Policy, Procedures and Considerations
A year-long study by the Commission on Youth, composed of
* Partner, Bremner, Baber & Janus, Richmond, Virginia; J.D., 1976, University
of Richmond, T.C. Williams School of Law; Virginia State Bar Family Law Section,
Board of Governors (1988-1992), Chairman, 1991-92; American Academy of Matrimo-
nial Lawyers, Fellow.
** Bremner, Baber & Janus, Richmond, 'Virginia; BA, 1988, University of Rich-
mond, Westhampton College; J.D., 1991, University of Richmond, T.C. Williams School
of Law.
1. Act of Apr. 7, 1993, ch. 930, 1993 Va. Acts 1464 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
16.1-226 (Cur. Supp. 1993)); Act of Apr. 7, 1993, ch. 929, 1993 Va. Acts 1422 (codi-
fied at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-230 (Cur. Supp. 1993)) (effective January 1, 1995).
2. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF VIRGINIA, REPORT ON THE FAMILY COURT PILOT PROJECT
TO THE GOVERNOR AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1993 (1993).
3. Act of Apr. 9, 1994, ch. 564, 1994 Va. Acts 789.
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lay, legal, and health care members, resulted in wholesale
changes to the statutes governing child custody determinations.
Chapter 6.1 of Title 20, Custody and Visitation Arrangements
for Minor Children,4 sets forth definitions, charges the court
with prioritizing adjudication of custody and visitation arrange-
ments, and establishes standards for determining the best in-
terests of the child.
The new section 20-124.1 applies standards for use in divorce
actions under Title 20, and also in custody and visitation deter-
minations arising in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Dis-
trict Courts independently of divorce.5 "Joint custody," "sole
custody," and a "person with a legitimate interest" are defined.6
The legislature instructed the courts to provide "prompt adju-
dication" before other considerations arising in the matter.7
Mediation, where appropriate, "shall" be employed as an alter-
native means of resolving custody and visitation disputes.!
The best interests of the child continue to be the court's
primary consideration. The court must give due regard to the
primacy of the parent-child relationship. However, upon a show-
ing by clear and convincing evidence that the best interest of
the child would be served, the court may award custody or visi-
tation to any other person with a legitimate interest.9
New factors to be considered in determining the best inter-
4. Act of Apr. 11, 1994, ch. 769, 1994 Va. Acts 1170 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 16.1-278.15, 20-79, 20-103, 20-107.2, 20-124.1 to -124.6 (Cure. Supp. 1994)).
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.15(F) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
6. Although not included in its definitions, courts presumably retain the authori-
ty to award: (1) "split custody" when each parent has physical custody of a child or
children born of the parties, born of either parent and adopted by the other parent,
or adopted by both parents, and (2) "shared custody" when each parent has physical
custody of the child for more than 110 days per year. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
108.2(GX2), (GX3) (Cum. Supp. 1994). The Assembly omitted split and shared custody
from the list of definitions because these "statuses" are significant only for their im-
pact on the application of the child support guidelines.
7. Query whether the courts must now determine custody and visitation to in-
clude support and maintenance, prior to granting exclusive use and occupancy of the
marital residence, or an order excluding the offending spouse from the jointly owned
or rented family dwelling upon a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm, pursuant to
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-103 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
8. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
9. Id. cf. Bottoms v. Bottoms, - Va. App. _, 444 S.E.2d 276 (1994) (enunciating
that a lesbian mother was "unfit" in justifying the third-party custody.)
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ests of the child address concerns often impacting children
whose custody is in question. The court is now directed to give
"due consideration to the child's changing developmental
needs,"10 each parent's ability to "meet the emotional, intellec-
tual and physical needs of the child,"" the parents propensity
to "support the child's contact and relationship with the other
parent,"' and the parents ability to "cooperate in matters af-
fecting the child." 3 Although astute and sensitive judges al-
ready consider these factors in determining the child's best
interest, the fact that these considerations are now mandated
may render more consistent determinations from the court on
how the interests of the child may best be served.
2. Denial of Standing
The Assembly enacted legislation to exclude from the defini-
tion of "a party with a legitimate interest" anyone whose paren-
tal rights had been involuntarily terminated during the course
of a legal adoption.'4 Similarly, any person convicted of rape or
incest is deemed not to have a legitimate interest in custody of
or visitation with any child born as a result.
C. Child Support
1. Social Services Review
Recently enacted legislation allows the Department of Social
Services (DSS) to initiate a review of the amount of support
ordered by any court." If upon review, the DSS determines
that a material change in circumstances has occurred, the find-
ings must be reported to the court that entered the order. A
material change in circumstances is defined as a presumptive
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3(1) (Cum. Supp. 1994).
11. Id. § 20-124.3(3).
12. Id. § 20-124.3(6).
13. Id.
14. Act of Apr. 10, 1994, ch. 719, 1994 Va. Acts 1041 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 16.1-241, 20-107.2 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
15. Id.
16. Act of Apr. 11, 1994, ch. 795, 1994 Va. Acts 1237 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 20-60.3, 63.1-252.2 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
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amount deviating at least ten percent, but not less than $25.00
per month, from the existing award. Notice is then given to
both parties, and either party may then request a hearing with-
in thirty days from receipt of the notice. Absent a request, the
court must enter the modified order or schedule a hearing on
the motion. Notification of the court's decision must be sent to
the parties and the Department.'7 The Division of Child Sup-
port Enforcement has indicated it will review only those orders
handled through Aid to Dependent Children, and those assigned
to it for collection. Orders will be reviewed no more than once
every three years in accordance with federal standards.
2. Health Care Insurance
An act passed in the 1994 General Assembly Session exempt-
ed the applicability of "season restrictions" from health insur-
ance enrollments when a payroll deduction order requires the
employer to enroll an employee, employee's spouse or former
spouse, or the employee's dependent children in the employer's
health care plan.18 These amendments to Virginia Code sec-
tions 20-79.3 and 63.1-250, in conformity with federal require-
ments, also prohibit disenrolling the employee's dependent chil-
dren unless the court or administrative order is no longer in
effect, the children are enrolled in another health care plan
with no discontinuation in coverage, or the employer eliminates
family coverage for all employees. 9 These amendments are de-
signed to ameliorate the devastating economic impact on non-
communicating families with children incurring uncovered medi-
cal expenses.
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-252.2 (Cum. Supp. 1994). If the court deviated from
statutory guidelines in the order under review, and the Department determines that
a material change in circumstances has occurred, the Department must schedule a
hearing with the court entering the order instead of notifying the parties who may or
may not request a hearing. Id.
18. Act of Apr. 11, 1994, ch. 767, 1994 Va. Acts 1165 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 20-79.3, 63.1-210.1 (Cum. Supp. 1994)). "Season restrictions" limit the ability of an
employer to alter those persons covered under his policy of insurance to certain dates.
19. Id.
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3. Revoking Delinquent Child Support Obligor's Occupational
License
A highly controversial measure allowing the court entering
the child support order, or the court enforcing such order, to
suspend the occupational license of a delinquent obligor passed
unheralded in the 1994 Session.' Any person engaging in a
business, trade, profession or occupation requiring a license
from the Commonwealth pursuant to Title 22, 38.2, 46.2 or
54.1, is subject to the suspension of his or her occupational
license if the delinquency is for a period of ninety days or for
more than $5,000.21 The obligee or the Department of Support
Enforcement may petition the appropriate court for an order to
suspend the delinquent obligor's license. The notice is to be
sent by certified mail with proof of "actual receipt."' The obli-
gor has thirty days from the date of receipt of notice to either
pay the delinquent funds or reach a financing agreement with
the obligee or the Department. If neither occurs within thirty
days, the Department of Social Services will file for the suspen-
sion of his or her occupational license.'
The remedy of suspension is not available to the court if
there is an "alternate remedy ... likely to result in the collec-
tion of the delinquency," or if the suspension would result in
"irreparable harm."' After the entry of the order, if the obligor
either pays the delinquency or reaches an appropriate
agreement, and acts pursuant to the agreement, the court shall
order reinstatement of the license.' Although this "get tough"
measure assisting in the collection of support arrearages is
subject to abuse, the Act appears to provide sufficient safe-
guards to assure use in only the most appropriate and
egregious cases.
20. Act of Apr. 11, 1994, ch. 764, 1994 Va. Acts 1160 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 20-60.3, 20-108.1, 63.1-252.1, 63.1-263.1 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-263.1 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
19941 985
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4. Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA)
The most far-reaching change enacted by the 1994 Session of
the Virginia General Assembly was the adoption of the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA)' to replace the Uni-
form Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA). Although
a thorough discussion of UIFSA is beyond the scope of this sur-
vey,27 the Act provides for uniform long-arm jurisdiction over
nonresidents. Once jurisdiction is obtained, UIFSA provides for
discovery and the elicitation of testimony through the "informa-
tion route" sections of the Act. It also limits the power of a
tribunal, other than one having continuing and exclusive juris-
diction over the order, to modify it.'
5. Criminal Violations of a Custody or Visitation Order
The General Assembly added section 18.2-49.1(B)' punish-
ing, as a Class 4 misdemeanor, ° a knowingly wrongful and
intentional act constituting a clear and significant violation of a
custody or visitation order. A second offense within a twelve-
month period constitutes a Class 3 misdemeanor."' A third
conviction within twenty-four months of the first conviction is a
Class 2 misdemeanor.
3 2
26. Act. of Apr. 10, 1994, ch. 673, 1994 Va. Acts 976 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16.1-296, 20.88.32 to .82 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
27. For a complete discussion and analysis, see Robert G. Spector, The Nation-
alization of Family Law: An Introduction to the Manual for the Coming of Age, 27
FAM. L.Q. 1 (1993).
28. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-296, 20.88.32 to .82 (Cum. Supp. 1994).
29. Act of Apr. 9, 1994, ch. 575, 1994 Va. Acts 800 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§
16.1-241 and 18.2-49.1 (Gum. Supp. 1994)).
30. Punishable by a fine of not more than $250. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-11(d)
(Cum. Supp. 1993).
31. Punishable of a fine of not more than $500. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-11(c)
(Cum. Supp. 1993).
32. Punishable by either confinement in jail for not more than six (6) months or
a fine of not more than $1,000, or both. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-11(b) (Cum. Supp.
1993). Query whether this amendment renders any person who "knowingly, wrongfully
and intentionally" engages in conduct constituting a "clear and significant" violation of
an order, guilty of criminal, as opposed to civil, contempt. If so, all such violations
must be sent to the law side of the court, and the Commonwealth attorney's office
must prosecute the action, even when the remedy sought is future compliance, rather
than punishment for past conduct. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 633 (1988),
986 [Vol. 28:981
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D. Miscellaneous
1. Separate Maintenance
The Legislature passed a law providing that certain provi-
sions of Title 20 of the Virginia Code apply with equal weight
to suits for divorce and for separate maintenance. Sections
affected include section 20-103 authorizing pendente lite sup-
port, section 20-107.1 specifying the factors to be considered
when awarding support and modification of an order of support,
and section 20-109 defining the effect of stipulations or agree-
ments.'
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Equitable Distribution of Marital Property
1. Classification of Property
The Virginia Court of Appeals has limited its broad expan-
sion of the transmutation doctrine of previous years." In the
case of Huger v. Huger," the court of appeals reversed a trial
court's finding that the 451 shares of stock were marital prop-
erty stating that when a donee presents sufficient evidence to
rebut the statutory presumption of marital property, and the
other party presents no evidence to the contrary, the presump-
tion is rebutted." The court of appeals found that the husband
had sufficiently rebutted the presumption of marital property. 7
The husband had appealed the trial court's finding that the
stock was marital property, claiming that under section 20-
cited in Kessler v. Commonwealth, - Va. App. _, 441 S.E.2d 223 (1994); Gompers v.
Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911).
33. Act of Apr. 9, 1994, ch. 518, 1994 Va. Acts 724 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 20-103, -107.1, -109 (Cum. Supp. 1994)).
34. See, e.g., Ellington v. Ellington, 8 Va. App. 48, 378 S.E.2d 626 (1989); Lam-
bert v. Lambert, 6 Va. App. 94, 367 S.E.2d 184 (1988).
35. 16 Va. App. 785, 433 S.E.2d 255 (1993).
36. Id. at 788, 433 S.E.2d at 257 (citing Stainback v. Stainback, 11 Va. App. 13,
396 S.E.2d 686 (1990)).
37. Id.
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107.3(A)(1)(ii), the property should be classified as separate.'
According to the husband, he owned 451 shares of stock, given
to him by his father during the marriage. 9 The husband pre-
sented evidence showing that the shares were titled solely in
his name and were always intended as separate property. ° He
also contended that an additional forty shares of stock received
from the estate of his deceased brother, and eighty-five shares
of stock received from his father prior to the marriage, were
also separate property. The wife presented no contrary evi-
dence.41
The court then had to determine whether the shares of stock
received by the husband were transmuted into marital property
as a result of the efforts of either party during the marriage.42
Where a spouse fails to separate, and instead commingles sepa-
rate property with marital property, the chancellor must classi-
fy the property as marital if the increase in value was due to
the efforts of either party.' In Huger, the court found that
since the parties did not own a majority of stock, they did not
have unbridled discretion over the asset."M Moreover, the hus-
band and wife both drew salaries from the company which pro-
vided sufficient compensation for any work effort.' Therefore,
the court concluded that the evidence failed to prove the trans-
mutation of stock into marital property due to the efforts of
either the husband or the wife.46
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(AX1Xii) (Cum. Supp. 1994) (defining as separate
property all property acquired during the marriage by bequest, devise, descent, survi-
vorship or gift from a source other than the other party).
39. 16 Va. App. at 787, 433 S.E.2d at 257.
40. Id. at 788, 433 S.E.2d at 257.
41. Id. at 789, 433 S.E.2d at 258.
42. Id. at 788-89, 433 S.E.2d at 257-58 (citing Pommerenke v. Pommerenke 7 Va.
App. 241, 248, 372 S.E.2d 630, 633-34 (1988)). The court of appeals noted that the
stocks received by the husband prior to the marriage remained separate property,
pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(AX1Xi), unless the property becomes transmut-
ed into marital property pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(AX3Xa). Id. at 788
n.1, 433 S.E.2d at 257 n.1.
43. Id. at 788, 433 S.E.2d at 257 (explaining the doctrine of transmutation).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 789, 433 S.E.2d at 258.
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Additionally, in the case of Stratton v. Stratton,4 7 the court
of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling that property the
husband purchased from the marital business with separate
funds constituted a separate asset.' During the marriage, the
husband established and was the sole stockholder of Stratton
Auto Sales, Inc., a used car business from which he received a
salary as an employee.49 The parties agreed that the business
was marital property. During the marriage, the business pur-
chased property pursuant to a land sales contract. The pur-
chase price of $15,000.00 was financed over ten years." In
February, 1989, the husband purchased the property from the
marital business, using inherited separate fimds.' He paid
$6,940.00 to the business and assumed the loan on the land
sales contract. 2 The cash "buy-out" figure to the business rep-
resented the amount of equity in the property at the time of
the transfer." The court of appeals declared that the once
marital property had become separate since the husband paid
valuable consideration for the marital asset.' In other words,
after the sale from the corporation to the husband, the property
became his individual property acquired during the marriage by
use of separate funds.' In the absence of fraud, the court
found the transaction to be proper."
In Decker v. Decker,5' the court of appeals affirmed a trial
court's ruling, and held that no abuse of discretion occurred
when the trial court allotted only twenty percent of appreciated
stock as marital property, even where the husband's efforts
47. 16 Va. App. 878, 433 S.E.2d 920 (1993).
48. Id. at 879, 433 S.E.2d at 921.
49. Id. at 880, 433 S.E.2d at 921.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 881-82, 433 S.E.2d at 922.
55. Id. The Virginia Code further defines separate property as all property ac-
quired during the marriage in exchange for or from the proceeds of sale of separate
property, provided that such property acquired during the marriage is then main-
tained as separate property. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(lXiii) (Repl. Vol. 1990 & Cure.
Supp. 1994).
56. 16 Va. App. at 881-82, 433 S.E.2d at 922 (citing Clements v. Clements, 10
Va. App. 580, 586-87, 397 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1990)).
57. 17 Va. App. 12, 435 S.E.2d 407 (1993).
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resulted in the asset's substantial appreciation." The court
found that the record contained evidence demonstrating that all
the appreciation in value could not be solely attributed to the
husband's efforts, even though the husband was president and
key executive of the company." This proposition was based on
the fact that five different executives, and not the husband
alone, determined company operations." Additionally, there
was evidence that after Mr. Decker became president, the rate
of growth and profitability of the company decreased."' Under
these circumstances, the court of appeals found no abuse of
discretion in characterizing only twenty percent of the appre-
ciation in value as marital property.s2
2. Consideration of Statutory Factors
In a case of first impression, the court of appeals in Floyd v.
Floyd' held that premarital contributions having an economic
impact may be considered in equitable distribution.' In Floyd,
the husband and wife began living together in 1979, had a
child out of wedlock in 1980, were married in 1985, and sepa-
rated in 1989.' The husband contended that the trial court
erred in making the equitable distribution award because it
expressly considered the five-year pre-marital cohabitation peri-
od." The court of appeals upheld the lower court's finding, and
ruled that the trial court could properly consider the parties'
premarital contributions, both monetary and nonmonetary,
insofar as those contributions affected the value of the marital
property."7 Nothing in Virginia Code section 20-107.3 prevents
58. Id. at 17-18, 435 S.E.2d at 411-12.
59. Id. at 17, 435 S.E.2d at 412.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 18, 435 S.E.2d at 412.
63. 17 Va. App. 222, 436 S.E.2d 457 (1993).
64. Id. at 224, 436 S.E.2d at 458.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 226, 436 S.E.2d at 459-60. The court reasoned that the marriage rep-
resented an economic partnership requiring that each party should, upon dissolution,
receive a fair proportion of the property. Id. (citing Roane v. Roane, 12 Va. App. 989,
994, 407 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1991)). The court clarified that the statute would not apply
if the couple never married. Id. (citing Kleinfeld v. Veruki, 7 Va. App. 183, 190, 372
S.E.2d 407, 411 (1988)).
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the trial court from considering premarital contributions to the
acquisition or maintenance of property.' However, the court
cautioned that considering the period of premarital cohabitation
without first determining its effect on the value of marital as-
sets would be inappropriate."
3. Dissipation
In Decker v. Decker,7 the court found that a husband's gift-
giving to his family after the separation did not constitute
"waste."71 Before the parties separated, the husband regularly
gave yearly cash gifts to his family and to his wife's family for
estate and tax planning purposes." After the parties separat-
ed, the husband continued to provide monetary aid, but only to
his side of the family. 3 The wife claimed that this constituted
dissipation of the marital estate. The trial court ruled, and the
court of appeals upheld, that the post-separation gifts comport-
ed with the parties' overall estate planning made during the
marriage, and it was not "waste" simply because the husband
discontinued giving to the wife's family. 4 The court found the
marital estate was actually preserved by the husband ceasing
to give the wife's family assistance since the value of the estate
was not thereby decreased. 5
68. 17 Va. App. at 226, 436 S.E.2d at 460. The court also relied on Aster v.
Gross, 7 Va. App. 1, 5-6, 371 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1988), which held that "fault" in
bringing about the dissolution of a marriage is not relevant to equitable distribution
unless it had an economic impact on the value of the marital estate.
69. 17 Va. App. at - 436 S.E.2d at 460.
70. 17 Va. App. 12, 435 S.E.2d 407 (1993).
71. Id. at 20, 435 S.E.2d at 413.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing Robinette v. Robinette, 736 S.W.2d 351 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987) assert-
ing that while gift giving can be waste, the fact that the parties had regularly pro-
vided financial assistance to nonresident family members provided sufficient evidence
to rebut that possibility.)
75. Id.
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B. Divorce
1. Defenses
In Hollis v. Hollis,76 the court of appeals found the defense
of connivance, the prior consent of one spouse to the misconduct
of the other, to be proven where the husband asserted that his
wife urged him to date and encouraged his adulterous relation-
ship with another woman." As a defense to his wife's suit for
divorce, the husband introduced a letter written by the wife
stating that she wished to be free from the marriage, and want-
ed the husband to share his life with [the other woman].7" The
wife also sent her husband and his paramour flowers and a
card stating: "My very best wishes to you both today, to your
new beginning."" As a third piece of evidence, the husband
introduced a document signed by both husband and wife which
acknowledged the wife's consent to the husband moving out of
the home, her knowledge that he would be moving in with
another woman, and promising that she would not employ adul-
tery as ground for divorce.'
The trial court found that the husband's adultery resulted
from his wife's connivance and procurement, and granted the
husband a no-fault divorce.8 The court of appeals affirmed the
lower court, stating the letters, flowers, and note supported the
finding that the wife encouraged, as well as consented, to the
husband's adulterous relationship.82
2. Spousal Support
In the case of Huger v. Huger,' the court of appeals ruled
that the traditional maxims of equity were not proper consider-
76. 16 Va. App. 74, 427 S.E.2d 233 (1993).
77. Id. at 77, 427 S.E.2d at 235.
78. Id. at 76, 427 S.E.2d at 234.
79. Id. at 76, 427 S.E.2d at 235.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 77, 427 S.E.2d at 235.
83. 16 Va. App. 785, 433 S.E.2d 255 (1993).
992 [Vol. 28:981
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ations in determining spousal support." In the case, the hus-
band argued that the wife should be barred from receiving
spousal support because of her "unclean hands."' The court of
appeals interpreted Virginia Code section 20-107.1 to impose a
mandatory duty upon the court to consider specific factors in
determining spousal support, which does not include the doc-
trine of "clean hands."' Since the court's divorce jurisdiction is
purely statutory, the "clean hands" doctrine is not a proper
argument in calculating spousal support."7
The court enumerated a standard for granting spousal sup-
port where grounds for divorce exist in the case Barnes v.
Barnes." If the denial of support would result in a "manifest
injustice," the court should award support despite a party's
inappropriate behavior.8 9 In Barnes, the wife admitted to post-
separation adultery, and the husband was granted a divorce on
that ground." However, the trial court awarded spousal sup-
port to the wife to avoid a "manifest injustice" in accordance
with section 20-107.1 of the Virginia Code."' The court ex-
plained that before making a finding of "manifest injustice," the
court must consider two factors: (1) the comparative economic
circumstances of the parties, and (2) the respective degrees of
fault of the parties.' The court declared that the respective
degrees of fault during the marriage are not limited to legal
grounds for divorce.9" Degrees of fault can "encompass" all be-
havior during the marriage affecting the marital relationship,
including any acts or conditions which contributed to the
marriage's failure, success, or well-being."' In this case, the
84. Id. at 790, 433 S.E.2d at 259.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 16 Va. App. 98, 428 S.E.2d 294 (1993).
89. Id. at 99, 428 S.E.2d at 296.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 101, 428 S.E.2d at 297. The Code of Virginia abolished the longstand-
ing absolute bar preventing a spouse who had a ground for divorce in his or her
favor, from being required to pay permanent spousal support. However, the Code
retains the provision barring payment where grounds for divorce exist for adultery,
sodomy or buggery, except when a manifest injustice would result. VA. CODE ANN. §
20-107.1 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
92. Barnes, 16 Va. App. at 102, 428 S.E.2d at 298.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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court granted the wife support based on the husband's annual
earnings of $93,750, as compared to the wife's income of $140
per month.95 The court also found it important that the wife's
adultery occurred after the separation, and after the marriage
had been irretrievably lost.'
3. Spousal Support and Property Settlement Agreements
In the case of Radford v. Radford,97 the court held that
spousal support in an agreement terminates upon the remar-
riage or death of the person to whom the support is payable,
unless the agreement expressly provides for its continuation."
There, the husband agreed to pay his wife $200 per month for
a period of five years, and incorporated this understanding into
the parties' final decree of divorce.' The wife remarried before
the five-year period elapsed."° The court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's termination of spousal support, holding that in
order to be consistent with the terms of Virginia Code sec-
tion 20-109, spousal support automatically terminates on the
death of either party or the remarriage of the payee unless
specifically stated otherwise in the parties' agreement.''
The court further extended the Radford ruling in MacNelly v.
MacNelly.'0 In MacNelly, the husband and wife entered into
a written property settlement agreement requiring the husband
to pay to the wife $7,000 per month in support from February,
1989 until February, 1996."~ The agreement specifically pro-
vided that if either party died before February 1, 1996, the
husband's support obligation would terminate."° However, the
agreement was silent as to the effect the wife's remarriage
95. Id. at 104, 428 S.E.2d at 299. Husband had previously supported wife's elec-
tion to remain home during the marriage. Id.
96. Id. at 103, 428 S.E.2d at 298.
97. 16 Va. App. 812, 433 S.E.2d 35 (1993).
98. Id. at 813, 433 S.E.2d at 36 (1993). Upon the death or remarriage of the
spouse receiving support, spousal support shall terminate unless otherwise provided
by stipulation or contract. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109 (Repl. Vol. 1990 & Supp. 1993).
99. Radford, 16 Va. App. at 813, 433 S.E.2d at 36.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. __ Va. App. -, 437 S.E.2d 582 (1993).
103. Id. at -, 437 S.E.2d at 582.
104. Id. at -, 437 S.E.2d at 583.
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would have on support."5 The court of appeals reversed the
trial court's ruling that support would continue beyond the
wife's remarriage."° Citing Radford, the court held that in or-
der to accomplish the stated objective of the statute and resolve
ambiguity, the statute requires express language, either
through citing the statute or expressly stating that remarriage
does not terminate a support obligation.07
C. Child Support
1. Tax Exemption
The court of appeals in Floyd v. Floyd"° asserted that the
custodial parent's right to claim dependent children as a tax
exemption cannot be reallocated by the court." The court
held that the divorce statutes do not convey broad equitable
powers on the trial court, and that the trial court cannot fash-
ion other remedies, such as allocating the dependency exemp-
tion."0
2. Review of Child Support
In the case of Hiner v. Hadeed,"' the court of appeals reit-
erated that "in any judicial or administrative proceeding for
child support, the presumptively correct amount of child sup-
port shall be the amount under the guidelines."" Before the
105. See id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 583.
106. Id. at _ 437 S.E.2d at 584.
107. Id. at 584. The court recognized that the agreement at issue differed from the
agreement in Radford. In Radford, the agreement was silent not only as to the effect
of remarriage, but also as to the effect of death. The agreement here contained an
express provision concerning the effect of death, but the court also insisted on specific
language with regard to remarriage to negate the statute. Id.
108. 17 Va. App. 222, 436 S.E.2d 457 (1993).
109. Id. at 231, 436 S.E.2d at 463 (citing I.R.C. § 152 (West Supp. 1994) which
states that the custodial parent is allowed to take the exemption unless a waiver is
signed); see also, Dietz v. Dietz, 17 Va. App. 203, 436 S.E.2d 463 (1993).
110. 17 Va. App. at 203, 436 S.E.2d at 463. Although § 20-108.1(BX15) does not
expressly provide for "transfer' of this exemption through waiver, entitlement to or
reallocation of the exemption is a factor that may justify deviating from the support
guidelines. Id.
111. 15 Va. App. at 575, 425 S.E.2d 811 (1993).
112. Id. at 578, 425 S.E.2d at 812.
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enactment of the guidelines, a party seeking to modify support
had to show that a material change in circumstance had oc-
curred since the last hearing or award."' In light of the adop-
tion of the guidelines in section 20-108.2, however, the Hiner
court ruled that a trial court could consider a modification peti-
tion without a finding of material change in circumstance, if
the last award predated, and significantly varied from the pre-
sumptively correct figure calculated according to the support
guidelines."' The court did not "repudiate the principle that a
party must otherwise prove a material change in circumstances
in order to obtain a modification of support, but for this limited
exception.""' In the Hiner case, the court found that the hus-
band had already petitioned for a reduction in support after the
guidelines came into effect."6 That decision, although errone-
ous, was never appealed."" Therefore, the husband had to
show a material change in circumstances since the last hearing
in order to modify support."' The husband's appeal was ulti-
mately dismissed for failure to show a material change in cir-
cumstance. Therefore, an adjustment to the previous child sup-
port order was barred through res judicata"
Similarly, in the case of Slonka v. (Slonka) Pennline,' the
court declared that the enactment of the shared custody
guidelines... was also a sufficient and substantial change in
circumstance to review past child support awards.' In
Slonka, the parties entered into a pre-guideline property settle-
ment agreement providing for joint custody.' After the
guidelines' effective date, the husband moved for a reduction in
support."M The court denied his motion, finding that there
113. Id. at 579, 425 S.E.2d at 814 (citing Featherstone v. Brooks, 220 Va. 443,
446-47, 258 S.E.2d 513, 515 (1979)).
114. Id. at 581, 425 S.E.2d at 815 (citing Milligan v. Milligan, 12 Va. App. 987,
407 S.E.2d 704 (1991)).
115. Id. at 579-80, 425 S.E.2d at 814.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. - Va. App. -, 440 S.E.2d 423 (Va. App. 1994).
121. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2(GX3) (Cum. Supp. 1994) (effective July 1, 1992).
122. __ Va. App. at -, 440 S.E.2d at 423.
123. _ Va. - at, 440 S.E.2d at 423.
124. _ Va. App. - at, 440 S.E.2d at 423.
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had been no material change in circumstances since the parties'
original agreement.' The court of appeals reversed the lower
court's determination, holding that because the 1992 amend-
ment to the Code created a new category for shared custody
arrangements, the trial court erred in requiring a showing,
other than the guideline amendment, which demonstrated a
significant disparity from the parties' agreed support
amount.'
3. Imputed Income
The court of appeals showed its willingness to impute income
to non-working mothers in two cases over the past year. In
Hamel v. Hamel,' the court imputed income to a mother who
voluntarily quit her employment.' The wife had a job earn-
ing approximately $17,000 per year.' Although she had vol-
untarily quit her job and earned no income at the time of the
hearing,"' the trial court refused to impute income to her.'
The court of appeals, however, reversed.'32
Also, in the case of Brody v. Brody," the father appealed
the denial of an award of child support where the mother had
voluntarily quit her job to stay home and care for a new child
from a subsequent marriage."4 In Brody, the Court considered
the sufficiency of evidence needed to impute income to a parent
who is allegedly voluntarily unemployed, and set forth the fol-
lowing guidelines: (1) when a parent leaves his or her employ-
ment, the burden is on that parent to show that the decision
was not voluntary, (2) the unilateral decision to stay at home
and care for a child is not sufficient, standing alone, to estab-
lish that unemployment is involuntary if child care services are
available and the cost of such services may be determined, and
125. - Va. App. _ at, 440 S.E.2d at 425.
126. - Va. App. at . 440 S.E.2d at 425.
127. __ Va. App. -, 441 S.E.2d 221 (1994).
128. Id. at _. 441 S.E.2d at 221-22.
129. Id. at __ 441 S.E.2d at 222.
130. Id. at , 441 S.E.2d at 222.
131. Id. at __ 441 S.E.2d at 222.
132. Id. at -_ 441 S.E.2d at 223.
133. 16 Va. App. 647, 432 S.E.2d 20 (1993).
134. Id.
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(3) imputed income may be based on employment recently and
voluntarily terminated.135
The mother in Brody had previously earned $54,000 per
year. 13 She stopped working in order to stay at home and
care for a child from her new marriage expected in December of
that year.13' The wife's new husband was transferred to Ger-
many, and the wife planned to follow him." The court of ap-
peals held that the father only had to present evidence suffi-
cient to enable the trial judge to project the amount of imputed
income and that figure could be based on her previous employ-
ment and earnings."9
In Whitaker v. Colbert," the court of appeals upheld the
trial court's refusal to treat a father's personal injury settle-
ment as income in calculating child support. 4' The trial court
held that the personal injury settlement was not "income" with-
in the scope of Virginia Code section 20-108.2(C), as that sec-
tion applies to income, not capital recoupment. 4 The court
found that although the father's unapportioned personal injury
claim included an income element of lost earnings, the award
also included capital elements of compensation for medical
expenses, loss of earning capacity, disability, injury and pain
and suffering, and it would be speculative to attribute a portion
of the settlement to lost wages.' Therefore, the court found
that the evidence did not prove that the settlement generated
income to Colbert.'
The court did, however, impute Social Security benefits as
income to the father. The children received the benefits as a
result of their father's disability. The court determined that the
benefit received by the children should be considered income
derived from the father, and should be included in the computa-
135. Id. at 650-51, 432 S.E.2d at 22.
136. Id. at 649, 432 S.E.2d at 21.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 651, 432 S.E.2d at 22.
140. __ Va. App. -, 442 S.E.2d 429 (Va. App. 1994).
141. Id.
142. Id. at -, 442 S.E.2d at 431.
143. Id. at -, 442 S.E.2d at 431.
144. Id. at -, 442 S.E.2d at 431.
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tion of his ongoing support obligation as a credit against that
obligation."
The court found the Social Security benefits received by the
children were "entitlements" earned by the father through his
earlier employment, and may be considered as a substitute for
his lost ability to provide for the children.' The father, the
court declared is entitled to a credit for that alternative pay-
ment of ongoing support. 4 ' This was not a retroactive modifi-
cation of support, the court found, but rather a source of funds,
indirectly attributable to a parent, to be used to satisfy that
parent's court ordered obligation.4"
4. Child Support and Property Settlement Agreements
In the case of Kelly v. Kelly,149 the parties executed a prop-
erty settlement agreement that was affirmed, ratified and incor-
porated by reference into their final decree of divorce.50 The
husband relinquished all equity in the jointly owned marital
residence to the wife, in exchange for never paying child sup-
port. The wife agreed to hold him harmless from any child
support payment should she ever successfully petition for child
support. When the wife subsequently petitioned and was
awarded child support by the trial court, the husband sought to
enforce the agreement's reimbursement provision. The trial
court held that the reimbursement provision was void as con-
trary to public policy.'5' The court of appeals reversed, holding
that where a trial court affirms, ratifies, and incorporates by
reference an agreement into its decree, it shall be deemed for
all purposes to be a term of the decree. 5 ' After twenty-one
145. - Va. App. at -, 442 S.E.2d at 432. The court cited other jurisdictions that
have followed the same approach.
146. Id. at 431.
147. See also, Commonwealth ex. rel. Comptroller of Virginia v. Skeens, _ Va.
App. - 442 S.E.2d 432 (1994) (holding that the trial court has the sound discretion
to credit Social Security benefits paid to children toward arrears in certain circum-
stances).
148. Id. at - 442 S.E.2d at 433.
149. 17 Va. App. 93, 435 S.E.2d 421 (1993).
150. Id. at 94, 435 S.E.2d at 422.
151. Id. at 95, 435 S.E.2d at 423.
152. Id. at 96, 435 S.E.2d at 423.
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days, the judgment of a trial court may not be modified unless
it is void."5 Since the validity of the agreement was not chal-
lenged before the divorce decree was entered, or within twenty-
one days thereafter, the trial court lost jurisdiction of the case
except for the limited purpose of revising child custody and sup-
port." ' The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the Court of
Appeals decision and affirmed the trial courts ruling that the
provision which substantially altered the childrens right to
receive support was void because it was violative of clear estab-
lished law.155 The court further ruled that because the judg-
ment was void. It could be attached and vacated in any court
at any time, directly or collaterally."
D. Paternity
In the case of Dunbar v. Hogan,'57 the court of appeals
found that a sworn declaration of paternity, although having
the same legal effect as a judgment entered pursuant to
Virginia Code section 20-49.8,'" is not res judicata on the is-
sue of paternity, nor does it collaterally estop a party from
adjudicating the issue where no previous judicial determination
of paternity has been made. 9 In Dunbar, the father signed a
sworn declaration stating he was the father of a child born out
of wedlock to Ms. Hogan. Three months later, the mother filed
a petition in the juvenile court seeking child support. Dunbar
then requested, and the court ordered, paternity tests. The test
results excluded Dunbar as the biological father of the
child."6 Dunbar defended Hogan's support petition on the
ground that the mother obtained his declaration of paternity by
153. Id. A judgment may not be modified after 21 days unless it is void because of
extrinsic or collateral fraud, or entered by a court that did not have jurisdiction over
the subject matter or the parties. VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:1 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
154. 17 Va. App. at 96, 435 S.E.2d at 424.
155. Kelley v. Kelley, No. 931522, 1994 WL503255 (Va. Sept. 16, 1994).
156. Id. at *3.
157. 16 Va. App. 653, 432 S.E.2d 16 (1993).
158. Code § 20-49.8 allows a judgment or order establishing parentage to include
provisions for support, custody, etc. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.8 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
159. 16 Va. App. at 659, 432 S.E.2d at 19, 20.
160. Id. at 655-56, 432 S.E.2d at 1.
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fraud, and on the ground that he was not the child's biological
father.1
61
The trial court ruled that the declaration of paternity was
not obtained by fraud, and held that the provisions of former
code section 20-49.1 estopped Dunbar from disclaiming that he
was the child's father, and from disproving his paternity with
evidence of HLA test results.'62 The trial judge ruled that by
giving the declaration of paternity the "same legal effect as a
judgment" entered pursuant to code section 20-49.8, as required
by section 20-49.1(B), the issue of paternity had already been
decided, and the father was estopped from relitigating the
issue."6 The court of appeals reversed the judgment, finding
that the issue of paternity had never been judicially
determined.'
According to the court of appeals an affidavit of paternity,
having the same legal effect as a judgment entered pursuant to
section 20-49.8, for purposes of determining or enforcing sup-
port, custody, visitation or guardianship, supports adjudication
of those issues without litigating paternity.'6
The sworn statement or a ninety-eight percent test result,
however, does not have the same legal effect as a judgment for
all purposes. While a sworn statement or test result may "have
the same legal effect" as a judgment of paternity for purposes
of support, custody and visitation, the fact of paternity carries
certain rights, such as inheritance, which section 20-49.8 does
not address." The statute does not preclude a father from
raising paternity absent a prior adjudication. 16
E. Contempt of Court
The court of appeals in Kessler v. Commonwealth,"8 re-
versed the trial court's denial of Kessler's request for a jury
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 658, 432 S.E.2d at 19.
165. Id. at 659, 432 S.E.2d at 19.
166. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.8 (Repl. Vol. 1990 & Cure. Supp. 1994).
167. Id.
168. _ Va. App. _ 441 S.E.2d 223 (1994).
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trial on a contempt charge. 69 On appeal from the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations District Court, the Botetourt County
Circuit Court found that Kessler, in arrears for over $18,000,
had a long-standing history of willful failure to pay child sup-
port. The court sentenced Kessler to serve eleven months in
jail, and did not permit him to purge the contempt charge by
paying the support arrearage."'
The circuit court first determined, contrary to the trial court's
rulings, that Kessler was being tried for criminal as opposed to
civil contempt because the Order sentenced him to jail without
any provision to enable him to purge himself of the charge.'
Citing Baugh v. Commonwealth,"2 the court declared that the
authority of the courts to punish for criminal contempt in the
absence of a jury was limited to "petty contempt," having a
penalty "not exceeding six months.""'3 Since Kessler was sen-
tenced to a term in excess of six months in jail, the right to a
trial by jury attached, and the case was subsequently reversed
and remanded."'4
F. Jurisdiction After Virginia Code Section 20-79(c) Referral
In Crabtree v. Crabtree, " a panel of the court of appeals
was called to determine whether a circuit court, in transferring
matters pertaining to child support and custody to a juvenile
and domestic relations district court divested itself of jurisdic-
tion to reinstate the matters and hear those issues. 6 The
court noted that section 16.1-244 vests circuit courts and
juvenile and domestic relations district courts with concurrent
jurisdiction over "custody, guardianship, visitation or support of
children when such [an issue] is incidental to a determination
169. Id. at -, 441 S.E.2d at 223.
170. Id. at -, 441 S.E.2d at 224.
171. Id. at -, 441 S.E.2d at 224.
172. 14 Va. App. 368, 417 S.E.2d 891 (1992).
173. Id. at 374, 417 S.E.2d at 895.
174. __ Va. App. at -, 441 S.E.2d at 225. It will be interesting to see how courts
implement this rule. Must the court make a ruling on what punishment will be im-
posed prior to hearing evidence relating to the contempt citation? How will the court
know, since the jury presumably will do the sentencing?
175. 17 Va. App. 81, 435 S.E.2d 883 (1993).
176. Id. at 81, 435 S.E.2d at 883.
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of causes pending in such courts."'77 The court cited section
20-121.1 of the Virginia Code which authorizes a circuit court
to reinstate a matter previously stricken from the docket, and
noted that section 20-108 bestows on circuit courts, after the
entry of a final decree, jurisdiction to modify its decree as to
matters affecting custody, support and visitation of minor
children.'78
Upon examination of the language in section 20-79(c), the
court noted that the language of the statute does not "divest"
the circuit court of its "jurisdiction" to consider matters over
which it had concurrent jurisdiction. 9 The court concluded
that section 20-79(C) does not place a limitation on the circuit
court's jurisdiction, but rather is designed to expand the tools
available to the circuit court to enforce its orders with regard to
certain issues."8 Accordingly, the circuit court had continuing
jurisdiction, even after the transfer of certain matters to the
juvenile and domestic relations district court, and retained the
power "in its discretion" to reinstate the case on the docket,
and adjudicate those issues.181 Since the circuit court, under
the current statutory scheme, would hear de novo appeals from
the juvenile and domestic relations district court, an effective
argument can be made that it serves judicial economy to simply
reinstate the matter on the circuit court's docket, and have a
hearing, an appeal from which would not result in trying the
matter anew.
G. Effect of Appeal
Not only has the advent of the court of appeals provided
practitioners with a formidable body of case law, but also the
appeal as of right from final orders in domestic relations mat-
ters creates numerous possible issues to be presented. Three
177. Id. at 85, 435 S.E.2d at 886.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 86, 435 S.E.2d at 887.
180. Id. at 86-87, 435 S.E.2d at 887.
181. Id. at 87, 435 S.E.2d at 887.
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such cases, Wagner v. Wagner,"2 Decker v. Decker," and
Reid v. Reid," illustrate this point.
The Wagner court held that upon remand from a previous
appeal, the trial court did not err in taking additional evidence
to ascertain the current value of all marital assets." Citing
Gaynor v. Hird,' the court affirmed that the reason for
revaluation on remand was the same as in the original hearing,
so as "to obtain the most accurate valuation and equitable
distribution."7
The court of appeals in Decker held that the trial court was
without jurisdiction to modify its pendente lite spousal support
award while the final decree of divorce was on appeal, absent
obtaining leave of the court of appeals to seek a
modification."
The issue of a trial court's authority to order restitution from
a spouse who received spousal support payments pursuant to a
court order when the order was reversed on appeal, was deter-
mined in Reid v. Reid.'89 In holding that the court of appeals'
reliance on Flemings v. Riddick's Executor"9 was misplaced,
the Supreme Court cited sections 20-109 and 20-112, which
authorize a court to increase, decrease or terminate an award.
The court concluded that the General Assembly modified the
inherent power described in Flemings to order restitution and
that the court now retained no such authority. 9'
182. 16 Va. App. 529, 431 S.E.2d 77 (1993).
183. - Va. App. -_, 440 S.E.2d 411 (1994).
184. 245 Va. 409, 429 S.E.2d 208 (1993).
185. 16 Va. App. at 529, 431 S.E.2d at 77.
186. 11 Va. App. 588, 400 S.E.2d 788 (1991).
187. 16 Va. App. at 529, 431 S.E.2d at 78 (1993).
188. _ Va. App. at -, 440 S.E.2d at 412. The Court in dictum indicated that
"only under compelling circumstances would this Court likely grant such leave." Id.
189. 245 Va. 409, 429 S.E.2d 208, (1993).
190. 46 Va. (5 Gratt.) 272 (1848).
191. 245 Va. at 414-15, 429 S.E.2d at 210-11. This ruling seems to be a bit harsh,
especially in light of a party not being entitled to suspension of a judgment for
spousal support pending appeal, and the court of appeals ruling in Decker v. Decker,
only under compelling circumstances may the trial court leave to modify its order
pending appeal. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-676.1(D) (Repl. Vol. 1992); _ Va. App.
440 S.E.2d 411 (1994).
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H. Bankruptcy
The interplay among the laws of bankruptcy and matters of
equitable distribution, property settlement agreements and
support was recently decided in the cases of In re McKoy, s2
Douglas v. Douglas,9' and In re Robb."M In McKoy, the
court disapproved the show cause application for violation of
the automatic stay against Linda McKoy, and granted her mo-
tion for relief from stay.'95 The debtor, McKoy's former hus-
band, had failed to make a payment of $4,165.00 for her inter-
est in their marital real property, although he had recorded the
deed, tendered to him in escrow before making the required
payment.19
In Douglas, the court of appeals upheld the judgment of the
trial court in finding the appellant in contempt for failure to
comply with the terms of his divorce decree. The decree ratified,
affirmed and incorporated a provision where the appellant
agreed to indemnify the wife, and hold her harmless from pay-
ing a certain bank debt. 97 The court held that although he
listed the bank as a creditor he failed to list his wife as a cred-
itor, or to inform the bankruptcy court of the terms of the di-
vorce decree agreement with regard to the debt.'98
In Robb, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland, by
deeming a periodic support payment of $3,000 nondischargeable
in bankruptcy.' The appellant sought to disclose the pay-
ment in bankruptcy by characterizing the $3,000 payment as
non-support assistance to the wife's child from a former mar-
riage whom he never adopted. The wife asserted that the
$3,000 monthly payments were spousal support, and therefore
were not dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(A)(5).2"
192. 161 B.R. 941 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993).
193. 437 S.E.2d 244 (Va. App. 1993).
194. 23 F.3d 895 (4th Cir. 1994).
195. McKoy, 161 B.R. at 943.
196. 161 B.R. at 942.
197. __ Va. App. at ., 437 S.E.2d at 246.
198. Id.
199. 23 F.3d at 895.
200. Id. at 897.
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The Robb court, citing the husband's claim of the $3,000
monthly payment as alimony on his income tax returns, applied
the doctrine of "quasi-estoppel," and declined to allow the
husband to argue that the payments constituted something
other than alimony.20' Even absent the doctrine of quasi-es-
toppel, they were deemed exempted from discharge because the
payments bore no relation to the needs of the wife's daughter
from a previous marriage, and that the parties clearly and
mutually intended the $3,000 monthly payments to qualify as
alimony.
202
201. Id. at 898.
202. Id. at 899.
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